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Using a dictator game, we examine the other‐regarding behavior of allocators, who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making an allocation decision without consultation on behalf of a two‐person group between their group and another group. We then contrast the behavior of the same individuals in an analogous interindividual situation. We also explore other‐regarding perceptions of passive recipients, who are asked to give behavioral forecasts of how they would behave if assigned the allocator role and how they think their allocators would behave. Gender differences are found in both behavior and perceptions. Males are significantly more self‐interested and less other‐regarding when they are responsible for a group, while females behave similarly under both conditions. Female recipients' forecasts of their own behavior are significantly higher than both their expectations of allocators and the actual female behavior observed in the experiment. Both male and female recipients underestimate the other‐regarding behavior of allocators.

We demonstrate in a laboratory experiment that the effectiveness of performance-contingent incentives is inversely related to risk-aversion levels. For about 16.5% of participants, performance fails to improve under performance-pay, and the probability of such failure increases with risk-aversion. This phenomenon works in part through the reduced effort level of more risk-averse individuals when effort level is positively correlated with risk exposure. It is also associated with higher self-reported levels of stress by more risk-averse people working under performance-contingent pay. We find no evidence of such stress causing decrements in the quality of effort affecting performance after controlling for effort level. However, controlling for effort, more risk-averse participants perform better under a fixed salary, leaving less room for improvement under performance-pay.

This paper aims to evaluate the use of personal connections to circumvent formal procedures, known as blat in the Soviet era, in post-Soviet societies by studying its role in graduate employment recruitment.

To do this, the extent to which and how blat is used by graduates to find a job in the city of Mykolayiv in Ukraine is analysed through 85 face-to-face structured interviews with those who in the past seven years have sought employment after graduating from university.

The finding is that blat is widely used by graduates to find a job. However, contrary to the existing literature which suggests that blat has become commodified in post-Soviet market societies with monetary payment being requested by and given to personal connections “pulling strings”, no evidence is found that this is the case. Instead, this remains a non-monetised form of friendly help by and for close social relations, akin to the Soviet era, and is viewed in a positive or neutral manner by participants even though its consequences can be to circumvent meritocratic formal recruitment procedures and foster nepotism and cronyism.

This study of blat is limited to analysing graduate recruitment in one city in Ukraine. Broader empirical research on the contemporary role of blat in this and other spheres in post-Soviet societies and beyond is now required so as to develop a more nuanced context-bound understanding of both the positive and negative facets of this social practice in contemporary societies.

This study reveals that blat is commonly used to find graduate jobs and is widely viewed as a socially acceptable practice, despite hindering meritocratic recruitment procedures.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which the practice of using personal networks to obtain goods and services or to circumvent formal procedures, known as blat in the Soviet era, persists in post-Soviet societies and whether its character has altered.

To do this, the prevalence and nature of blat in the education sector in the city of Mykolayiv in Ukraine is analysed using 200 face-to-face structured interviews with a spatially stratified sample of Mykolayiv residents and 30 follow-up semi-structured in-depth interviews.

The finding is that blat is widely used to gain places in kindergarten, schools and universities. However, unlike Soviet era blat which took the form of non-monetised friendly help in the market-oriented society of post-Soviet Ukraine, both possessing control over access to assets such as education, as well as possessing personal connections to those with control over access to these assets, is increasingly viewed as a commodity to be bought and sold, and illicit informal monetary payments are now commonplace. The result is that nepotism, cronyism, bribery and corruption hinder meritocratic processes.

This paper examines the prevalence and nature of blat in just one sector in one post-Soviet country. An analysis across a wider range of sectors in various post-Soviet societies is now required to develop a more context-bound and nuanced understanding of blat in post-Soviet societies.

This is the first in-depth empirical evaluation of the prevalence and nature of blat in contemporary post-Soviet societies.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of individual risk preferences on the effectiveness of incentive pay schemes, by examining the link between individual effort and risk aversion in situations where outcome uncertainty multiplies with effort. Such “multiplicative noise” situations are common, occurring whenever payment is awarded per success rather than per attempt.

The paper develops a theoretical model which predicts a negative risk aversion-effort link under multiplicative noise without a performance target (PT), and a weaker negative link once the target is introduced. This model is then taken to the data from a lab experiment where participants were randomly assigned to a control group, which received fixed pay, and a treatment group, which received a piece rate awarded with a certain probability, with and without a PT. Risk aversion is measured with a menu of lottery choices offered at the end of the experiment.

Compared to their peers in the control group, the more risk-averse participants in the treatment group put in progressively less effort in the absence of a PT. The introduction of a PT substantially weakens this negative risk aversion-effort link, so that there are no more significant differences in performance between the more and the less risk averse.

The paper’s findings speak to the empirical puzzles of incentive pay schemes backfiring and of the proliferation of PTs. The negative risk aversion-effort link may be one reason behind the failure of incentive schemes to deliver improved performance, whereas the weakening of this link may be one justification for the existence of PTs.

In the multiplicative noise environments, managers should take their workers’ risk preferences into account when designing incentive pay schemes. A PT may be a useful motivational tool for the risk-averse workers who are more likely to under-perform.

The multiplicative noise environment has been largely overlooked by the existing literature, yet it is common in practice. An example is the work of a sales agent who receives a bonus per sales which succeeds with a certain probability after each customer contact. This paper is one of the first to model, and test experimentally, worker performance in this environment.